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Declaratory Judgments: Federal Anticipatory
Relief from State Criminal Statutes After
Ste ffel v. Thompson
When . . . we consider the State governments and the national
governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems,
and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive,
that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the laws of the Union ....
-Publiuse
In Steffel v. Thompson' the Supreme Court addressed the question
whether declaratory relief is precluded when a good faith prosecution
for violation of a state criminal statute has been threatened but is not
pending.' Traditionally, declaratory relief had been thought available
only in circumstances where injunctive relief could also be obtained,4
requiring a showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circum-
stances.' But in Steffel the Supreme Court unanimously held:
[R]egardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate,
federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution
is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of
enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute . . .
While the Court clearly said that a declaratory judgment is available
in these circumstances, the majority opinion did not discuss the effect
of the federal declaratory judgment in subsequent litigation, leaving
that subject to be debated in two concurring opinions.!
Nevertheless, the full impact of the Steffel decision will depend
upon the ultimate resolution of the problem of the effect of a declara-
tory judgment in subsequent litigation. This note will review Steffel,
explore the general res judicata effects of declaratory judgments, and
examine the possibility of using a declaratory judgment as the basis
for injunctive relief.
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 514 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hmiilton) (small capitals
in original).
2415 U.S. 452 (1974).
3Id. at 454.
4 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 71-73 (1971).
5 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6 415 U.S. at 475.
7 Id. at 478 (White, J., concurring) ; id. at 479 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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AVAILABILITY OF A FEDERAL FORUm
The narrow problem which faced the Supreme Court in the Steffel
case was whether, under the Declaratory Judgment Act," a federal
forum was available to determine the constitutionality of a state criminal
statute where no state prosecution had been instituted, and where in-
junctive relief was not requested.
The facts of the case showed that Steffel and other members of
a group opposed to the Vietnam war had been distributing leaflets on
an exterior sidewalk to an Atlanta shopping center. The police were
summoned, and when they threatened to make arrests, the members of
the group departed. Two days later Steffel returned to the shopping
center with Sandra Lee Becker and again distributed leaflets. Once
again the police were summoned and threatened them with arrest.
Steffel stopped in order to avoid arrest, but Becker continued and was
arrested for violating the Georgia criminal trespass statute.' Steffel
immediately brought suit for declaratory relief from the threatened ap-
plication of the state criminal trespass statute.1"
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
0 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1503 (1972):
(a) A person commits criminal trespass when he intentionally damages any
property of another without his consent and the damage thereto is $100 or less,
or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the prop-
erty of another person without his consent.
(b) A person commits criminal trespass when he knowingly and without
authority:
(1) Enters upon the land or premises of another person, or into any part
of any vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, for an
unlawful purpose; or
(2) Enters upon the land or premises of another person, or into any part of
any vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, after receiv-
ing, prior to such entry, notice from the owner or rightful occupant that such
entry, is forbidden; or
(3) Remains upon the land or premises of another person, or within the
vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, after receiving
notice from the owner or rightful occupant to depart.
(c) A person convicted of criminal trespass shall be punished as for a
misdemeanor.
10 Originally, Ms. Becker joined the suit, but she withdrew because of her pending
state prosecution after the decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its
companion cases: Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) ; Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) ;
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 921
(5th Cir. 1972). A request for injunctive relief was also withdrawn on appeal. Id.
Prior to Becker's withdrawal, the district court dismissed the suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971), and
Steffel appealed. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action. 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972). The Su-
preme Court unanimously reversed the two lower courts, finding on the facts that the
circumstances of the case were appropriate for federal declaratory relief. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
[Vol. 50:567
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Aside from anticipatory relief, the only way an individual may
challenge the constitutionality of a state criminal statute is to pursue
"self-help"-that is, continue the conduct allegedly in violation of the
statute and, if prosecuted, raise the unconstitutionality of the statute as
a defense. Steffel and Becker made deliberate decisions as to the
costs and benefits of their course of conduct. 1 They had gone to the
shopping center with lawyers, apparently anticipating arrest.2 Unlike
Steffel, Becker chose the self-help remedy-arrest and prosecution in
state court. Since there is a criminal penalty for violation of the statute,
the cost of seeking constitutional vindication in this manner may be
great. In fact, in many cases the cost of vindication through the self-
help remedy may be so great that no individual will be willing to chal-
lenge a potentially unconstitutional statute, with the result that con-
stitutionally protected conduct may be prevented."
21 "Cost" in this context is the chance of the penalty being imposed (the chance of
the statute not being found unconstitutional) multiplied by the severity of the potenial
penalty. No matter how well qualified the individual's counsel is, the vagaries of consti-
tutional law necessarily render advice on specific conduct uncertain. There is no situa-
tion where the individual can act in violation of the statute and be certain that no penalty
will be imposed. Some chance of punishment remains even if counsel's advice is perfect,
since the possibility exists of a procedural misstep or a discretionary refusal to review an
erroneous lower court decision when appealed to the United Stz~tes Supreme Court. So
long as there is a chance that some penalty will attach for violation of the statute, there
is a "cost" imposed on the person who violates it. See Birminglh.m, A Model of Criminal
Process: Game Theory and Law, 56 CORNELL L. Rav. 57 (1970). Professor Birming-
ham has constructed a game theory model that relates the various factors an individual
considers when deciding whether to violate a criminal statute. In applying this model,
the expected value of a given course of conduct to an individual is expressed as a func-
tion of five factors:
Utility to the individual of not violating the statute and not being punished.
Increase in utility to the individual from violating the statute without regard to
punishment.
Loss in utility to the individual from punishment without regard to conduct.
Likelihood of punishment to the individual not violating the statute.
Likelihood of punishment resulting from violation of the statute.
The difference between the conduct of Becker and that of Steffel can be explained
in terms of their different perceptions of the gain of utility from the conduct or of the
loss of utility from the punishment
12 Stipulation (Oct. 28, 1970), Brief for Petitioner (Appendix) at 18-21, Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
13 Since the unconstitutionality of a statute "as applied" is harder to show, the per-
ceived "costs" of a self-help constitutional challenge to a statute "as applied" is greater
than a self-help challenge to a statute void on its face. Judge Tuttle, concurring in the
Fifth Circuit panel's opinion, argued that if Steffel had challenged the Georgia statute as
unconstitutional on its face, rather than unconstitutional "as applied," the federal court
should be more willing to provide anticipatory relief in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 923-27 (5th Cir. 1972). Tuttle's argument
was rejected by the Supreme Court. 415 U.S. at 475. If the argument had been ac-
cepted, anticipatory relief would be denied when it is most valuable to the individuaL
Moreover, it would be denied under circumstances where a holding of unconstitutionality
1975]
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Anticipatory Relief
Federal courts have long provided a forum for constitutional ad-
judication prior to actual violation of a statute, so that potentially
unconstitutional statutes may be challenged without requiring individ-
uals to act at their peril. The federal forum is available when the cir-
cumstances are appropriate" to grant either injunctive or declaratory
relief, or both. The injunctive remedy has been available since the
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Young" that a federal district court
had inherent power to grant an injunction preventing state officials
from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes.' Congress and the
courts subsequently restricted the availability of this relief in order to
avoid impairing the states' ability to enact and enforce legitimate laws.
Following Ex parte Young, Congress passed laws requiring the forma-
tion of three-judge district courts which alone were empowered to
issue injunctions against enforcement of state statutes, 7 and providing
expedited direct appeals from these courts to the Supreme Court.' The
courts, mainly by practicing abstention and by requiring a showing of
irreparable harm, have also limited the availability of injunctive relief. 9
The declaratory judgment remedy has been available only since
1934.20 Initially, the Supreme Court said that a declaratory judgment
holding a state criminal statute unconstitutional was available only
under circumstances where injunctive relief could also be obtained.2'
The rationale was that if a declaratory judgment were allowed where an
injunction would not be, a plaintiff prevailing in the declaratory judg-
ment action could circumvent the requirements for an injunction by
petitioning for the injunction as "[f]urther necessary or proper relief" 2
based solely on the declaratory judgment. 8 However, not all the re-
is less insulting to the state legislators, who may never have intended for the statute to
be so applied.
14 Courts variously have imposed three requirements:
1) Actual controversy between the litigants (see text at notes 44-61 infra),
2) Irreparable injury to the plaintiff (see text at notes 119-125 infra),
3) Principles of federalism (see text at notes 62-73 infra).
'5 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'D Id.
"7 Three-judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (1970).
Is Id. § 1253.
19 See text at notes 122-28 infra.
2 oDeclaratory Judgment Act, Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (now 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970)).21 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (dictum).
2228 US.C. § 2202 (1970).
2 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943) (dictum).
See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), in which Marshall, Brennan, White and
[Vol. 50:567
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
quirements for an injunction have ever been applied to declaratory judg-
ments. For example, although only a three-judge court may enjoin
a state statute, the Supreme Court has held that a single district court
judge could declare a state statute unconstitutional, because Congress
did not apply the requirements of the three-judge court procedures for
injunctive relief to declaratory judgments."'
As long as a declaratory judgment was available only in circum-
stances where an injunction was also available, both forms of relief
were always requested. Thus, distinguishing between the two remedies
was rarely important. In Steffel, however, the Supreme Court held that
a declaratory judgment is available in circumstances where an injunc-
tion may not be, because a declaratory judgment has a "less intrusive
effect on the administration of state criminal laws."2" Once the Court
decided that a declaratory judgment was appropriate under these cir-
cumstances, the question that naturally arises is what effect the declara-
tory judgment will have in subsequent proceedings.
The Concurring Opinions in Steffel
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in Steffel joined by
Chief justice Burger, questioned "whether the granting of a declara-
tory judgment by a federal court will have any subsequent res judicata
effect or will perhaps support the issuance of a later federal injunc-
tion."2 While he is content to let persons threatened with state criminal
prosecutions seek a declaratory judgment and forgo the offending con-
duct,"7 he does not think that in passing the Declaratory Judgment Act
"Congress intended to provide persons wishing to violate state laws
with a federal shield behind which they could carry on their contemplated
conduct.""6 An arrest for the offending conduct prior to resolution of
a suit for declaratory judgment "would constitute a pending prosecution
and bar declaratory relief under the principles of Samuels."2 Also,
according to Rehnquist, "A declaratory judgment is simply a statement
of rights, not a binding order supplemented by continuing sanctions.""
Even if the petitioner is granted a declaratory judgment, the judgment
should not be res judicata in a later state prosecution and evidently
Douglas rejected this rationale. Stewart and Blackmun also rejected it in the companion
case of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 89 (1971) (concurring).
24 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Afartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963).
2s 415 U.S. at 469.
26 Id. at 479 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
2 1d. at 478.
28 Id. at 480.
291d.
30 Id. at 482.
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should have only stare decisis effect in subsequent federal proceedings.3 1
Moreover, an injunction should not be issued on the basis of the declara-
tory judgment;" nor can the threatened individual who is in fact sub-
sequently arrested return to federal court. Instead, Justice Rehnquist
would leave him to "raise the federal declaratory judgment in the state
court for whatever value it may prove to have.""3
Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion," squarely dis-
agreed. In his opinion, "[T]here is every reason for not reducing de-
claratory judgments to mere advisory opinions."" Thus, White asserts
that a final declaratory judgment should be accorded res judicata effect
in any later prosecution of the same conduct." Nor is he willing to
agree with Rehnquist "that the federal court, having rendered a declara-
tory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, could not enjoin a later state
prosecution . . . . "'i Finally, White thinks Samuels v. Mackell"
should not be applied to dismiss a pending federal action for declaratory
relief solely because a state prosecution has subsequently been filed."
To resolve this conflict concerning the effect of the declaratory
judgment in subsequent litigation, it is necessary to examine the nature
of declaratory judgments.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
In 1934, with the wave of legal reform stemming from the De-
pression, Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act,"0 which con-
fers upon federal courts the power to "declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party . . . whether or not further re-
lief is or could be sought." 1 At the time the act was passed it was con-
sidered a radical departure from traditional notions of American juris-
prudence because it provided a remedy before an injury had occurred.
The advantage of such a proceeding to an individual contemplating the
performance of an act which may violate a state criminal statute, but
81 Id. at 482 n.3.
32 Id. at 480-82.
83 Id. at 482.
so-Id. at 476 (White, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 477.
8Id.
87 Id.
'8401 U.S. 66 (1971) (where prosecution in state court preceded the action for
federal declaratory relief, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied).
89 415 U.S. at 478.
40 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970)).
4128 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). In the 1934 version of the statute the word "prayed"
was used instead of "sought." See Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955,
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which he believes to be constitutionally protected, is apparent.42
Congress, however, was not strictly concerned with providing relief
from state criminal laws when it passed the Declaratory Judgment Act.
As Justice Rehnquist points out, "[The Act's] primary purpose was to
enable persons to obtain a definition of their rights before an actual
injury had occurred, rather than to palliate any controversy arising from
Ex parte Young ... ""
Actual Controversy
The problem with the declaratory judgment is that it may be viewed
as an "advisory opinion," which federal courts may not constitutionally
render.44 In defining the constitutional limit, federal courts have estab-
lished that an action must present neither a hypothetical controversy
that may never become real," nor a past controversy where a recurrence
is wholly conjectural." Where an injury has occurred, this inquiry is
usually not relevant. However, in a declaratory judgment action, the
purpose of which is to avoid injury, the existence of an actual con-
troversy must be shown.
The possibility that a declaratory judgment might be no more than
an advisory opinion caused Justice Brandeis to state, in several opin-
ions,47 that "the [declaratory judgment] proceeding is not a case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution,"48
42 During the debate in Congress over the Declaratory Judgment Act, one Senator
expressed the idea of the declaratory judgment procedure metaphorically: "Under the
[prior] law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you have
stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you tum on the light and then
take the step." S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Ralph
Gilbert). See also note 11 supra.
43 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"U.S. CONsT. art. III. The substantive decision in Steffel might be seen as an ad-
visory opinion because "the continuing existence of a live and zcute controversy" was in
doubt. 415 U.S. at 459 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the Court went on to de-
ide the issues in SteffeL In part, the Court may have chosen to decide the case in recog-
nition of the length of time a new appeal would take. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (the challenge to an anti-abortion statute is not mooted even though the appeal
takes more than nine months). The constitutional prohibtion against advisory opinions
as enunciated by the Supreme Court should be viewed as less than absolute, at least in its
application to arguably moot controversies. It has been suggested that the mootness
doctrine is often simply another way for the Supreme Court to avoid a problematic deci-
sion. Cf. Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373
(1974).
45 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 459 (1974) ("petitioner's concern with arrest has not been 'chimerical' . .
4 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969).
4TArizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 464 (1931) ; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289-90 (1928).
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928). Concurring in
the result, Justice Stone disagreed with Justice Brandeis (who would later write his fa-
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and hence is beyond the federal judicial power. Because the federal
Declaratory Judgment Act was preceded by declaratory judgment acts
in many of the states,"' the Supreme Court had ample opportunity to
comment on the constitutionality of the then-proposed act.5" Shortly
mous dissent in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936))
and chastised him:
"It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature un-
less absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." . . . There is certainly no
"case or controversy" before us requiring an opinion on the power of Congress
to incorporate the declaratory judgment into our federal jurisprudence. And the
determination now made seems to me very similar itself to a declaratory judg-
ment to the effect that we could not constitutionally be authorized to give such
judgments-but is, in addition, prospective, unasked, and unauthorized under any
statute.
277 U.S. at 291, quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905). Stone later
wrote the Court's opinion in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933)
(discussed at note 51 infra).
49 E. BORCHARD, DEcLtAAToRy JUDGMENTS 251 (1934). Borchard says that Rhode
Island (1876), Maryland (1888), Connecticut (1893, 1915) and New Jersey (1915) all
had "little used and narrow statutes granting a limited power to render declaratory judg-
ments . . . ." The first broad statute was in Michigan (191,9). At first, the Michigan
Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional because it imposed on the Michigan
courts a nonjudicial function (i.e., rendering an advisory opinion). Amway v. Grand
Rapids R.R. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350 (1920). Nevertheless, other states adopted
broad declaratory judgment statutes, for example: California (1921), Kansas (1921),
Kentucky (1922), Virginia (1922). E. BORCHARD, supra, at 254 n.21. Except for Michi-
gan, all the states held declaratory judgments constitutional. See, e.g., Blakeslee v. Wil-
son, 190 Cal. 479, 213 P. 495 (1923) ; State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, 190 Kan. 619, 201
P. 82 (1921) ; Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S.W.2d 481 (1930) ; Patter-
sons Ex'ers v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 131 S.E. 217 (1926). The Michigan Court over-
ruled itself in WArashington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618
(1930)..
By 1934, when the federal act was passed, over one-third of the states had enacted
declaratory judgment statutes, most of them modeled on the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act (which was drafted by Professor Borchard in 1922). Cf. 9A UNiFoRm LAWS
ANNOTATED 1-2 (1957). Also, by 1934 the highest courts in 19 states had expressly held
declaratory judgments constitutional. E. BORcHARD, supra, at 249.
50 Such cases arose under diversity jurisdiction or as federal questions appealed from
a state court. Liberty Whse. Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927), was the first such case.
It was brought under diversity jurisdiction in federal court seeking to have a Kentucky
law regulating tobacco sales declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sued the Attorney Gen-
eral of Kentucky, who was prepared to indict them for violation of the Kentucky law.
For reasons not altogether clear, plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment and not an
injunction. Since there was no federal declaratory judgment procedure, plaintiffs had
to ask the federal court to apply the state declaratory judgment act. In pre-Erie times
such an attempt was bound to fail. It did. It is interesting that this case involved a
fourteenth amendment challenge to a state criminal statute as in Steffel (the concern
with property rather than personal rights is appropriately different). See also Liberty
Whse. Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Marketing Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71
(1928) (later litigation by the same plaintiff). In Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
277 U.S. 274 (1928), the plaintiff Association sought to remove a cloud on title to the
Auditorium Theater in Chicago. Plaintiff held 99- and 198-year leases to the building
and the land respectively, but defendant owner, not an Illinois resident, refused permis-
sion to tear down the architectural landmark. Defendant removed to federal court,
where he ultimately prevailed. Cf. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1933).
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before the federal Declaratory Judgment Act was passed, the Supreme
Court overruled Justice Brandeis' assertion, holding that the federal
judicial power could be constitutionally exercised in a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding, "so long as the case retains the essentials of an ad-
versary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical controversy
.... "' As a result, under the federal declaratory judgment statute
that was enacted, a declaratory judgment can only be obtained "in a
case of actual controversy." 2 Today, it is "asserted in the fullest con-
fidence that declaratory judgment statutes are invulnerable to assault
upon any constitutional ground. . .. "'I
It is difficult to determine when an "actual controversy" exists,
particularly where an individual seeks to challenge a criminal law with-
out violating it. In order for the court to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion, the plaintiff must prove at least that he actually plans to engage
in the prohibited conduct and that he will be prosecuted if he does so." '
It may be sufficient, in a first amendment challenge, merely to show that
the plaintiff's exercise of protected rights is "chilled." " Of course, with-
out the commencement of a prosecution or the state's admission that it
will prosecute, " proof of an actual controversy is difficult to establish ;57
but now, after Steffel, it is clearly not impossible. 8
51 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (appeal from de-
nial by Supreme Court of Tennessee of a declaratory judgment). Appellant argued,
inter alia, that the state tax was an unconstitutional impediment to interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the case was sufficient to support
an injunction.
5228 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The 1934 version read "in case,; of actual controversy."
Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955. The statutory requirunent of "actual contro-
versy" may be more restrictive than the constitutional requirements. The constitutional
limit, however, has never been reached because of the self-contaiined restrictions of the
statute. The existence of the latent constitutional issue has, ro doubt, buttressed the
statutory requirement.
53 W. ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT § 8 (1951). Any case that
did not allege a sufficient controversy would face a statutory rather than a constitutional
objection.
54 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 42. But cf. note 44 supra.
r5 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844,
865-66 (1970). But see Steffel, 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring); Dickson,
Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24 VAND. L. Rnv. 257 (1971).
V See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MfacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 508 (1972). Even a stipu-
lation of jurisdiction by the defendant must be supported by evidence, because the parties
cannot confer jurisdiction on the court simply by agreement. Mimsfield, C. & L.M. Ry.
v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
57 Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
58 415 U.S. at 459:
Unlike three of the appellees in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41, peti-
tioner has alleged threats of prosecution that cannot be characterized as "imagi-
nary or speculative," id., at 42. He has been twice warned to stop handbilling
that he claims is constitutionally protected and has been told by the police that
if he again handbills at the shopping center and disobeys a warning to stop he
1975]
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In Steffel, police officers repeatedly warned the plaintiff to dis-
continue his conduct, and they arrested his companion, Ms. Becker, for
similar conduct. 9 Steffel wanted to return and distribute leaflets, but
the shopping center threatened to have him arrested if he did so. The
police said they would make the arrest."0 Steffel seems to have come as
close as one can to being arrested without criminal proceedings having
been instituted. The Supreme Court found a sufficient controversy on
the facts in Steffel. It remains to be seen how much less confrontation
would be sufficient."1
Principles of Federalism
When, as in Steffel, a declaratory judgment is used to challenge
a state statute in federal court, the court must also be concerned with
the relationship between the state and federal governments. In line
with this concern for the principles of federalism, the Supreme Court
held in 1971 that, absent bad faith harassment by the state, a declaratory
will likely be prosecuted. The prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion
is ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest has not been "chi-
merical," Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 508 (1961). In these circumstances, it
is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecu-
tion to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his
constitutional rights. See, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968).
Moreover, petitioner's challenge is to those specific provisions of state law which
have provided the basis for threats of criminal prosecution against him. Cf.
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 81 (1971) ; Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 399-
400 (1941).
59 See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
00 The prosecutor refused to commit himself to prosecution, saying he would deter-
mine whether or not he would prosecute on a case-by-case basis. See Becker v. Thomp-
son, 334 F. Supp. 1386, 1388 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
61A related concept is the doctrine of abstention to avoid premature constitutional
adjudication. Abstention of this sort is invoked where the first and second criteria are
satisfied-i.e., there is an actual controversy and no prosecution-but the federal court be-
lieves that the state statute could be construed by the state courts in a manner that would
not encompass the plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct. Cf. Railway Comm'n v.
Pullman, 312 U.S. 495 (1940) ; Steffel, 415 U.S. at 457-58 nn.7, 8. In such a case, the
federal court sometimes suspends consideration of the action for declaratory judgment
pending an affirmative showing that the plaintiff's conduct is covered by the statute. Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-12 (1972). The question of whether
plaintiff is clearly within the terms of the statute is the same inquiry as the immediacy
of the threat of prosecution. Both ask the question whether there is an actual controversy.
The question is not whether the prosecutor will prosecute, but whether that prosecution
has a chance for success in state court. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff can show deprivation
of a constitutional right, federal abstention from a declaratory judgment action on a
state criminal statute as applied in favor of a state court determination of the application
of state law is apparently not constitutionally or statutorily compelled, and after Steffel
may no longer even be appropriate. In Steffel, the Court held that the federal interest in
vindicating the individual who suffers a deprivation of his constitutional rights outweighed
the state's interest in unencumbered enforcement of its laws. 415 U.S. at 473.
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judgment is not available when a state prosecution has already liegun.2
This restraint is not derived from the statute or, strictly, from the
Constitution, as is the requirement of "actual controversy." Rather,
it stems from notions of the appropriate exercise of the federal courts'
discretion within the federal system. 8 Where a good faith state prose-
cution is already underway against the federal plaintiff, there is a pre-
sumption that the state court will protect his federal rights without
federal interference." Failing this, an appeal from the state courts
is available. 5 If the state proceedings are pursued in bad faith, for
example, as where the state's objective is harassment, that presump-
tion is exploded, and the federal courts need not abstain."6
Where the prosecution is not in bad faith, federal adjudication
would necessitate intervention in the state court proceedings either
through issuance of a stay disruptive of state court proceedings or
through duplicative and possibly inconsistent adjudications of the same
issue. Neither alternative would ensure or accelerate proper resolution
of the issues. 7 But intervention would not be unconstitutional. No-
where in the Constitution is the judicial power conditioned upon the
presence of good or bad faith. Rather, the underlying considerations
calling for restraint stem from the constitutional scheme of independent,
separate state systems of law."8
Ironically, at the time when it would be easiest to prove an "actual
controversy," i.e., once the prosecutor has brought charges, the federal
court must abstain. " Through the interaction of the "actual contro-
versy" requirement and the abstention doctrine, it -would be possible to
rule out all federal declaratory judgments against state criminal statutes
as either presenting no controversy or as appropriate for abstention.
82Kugler v. Helfant, 95 S. Ct. 1524, 1534 (1975). See Sartels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971).
13 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
See also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. '93 (1943).
64 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 US. 66
(1971). See Kugler v. Helfant, 95 S. Ct 1524, 1531 (1975). Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
65 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (1941).
6 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). If the plaintiff is engaging in
conduct in violation of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute and in good faith the
prosecutor indicts him, the federal court must abstain. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971). Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
67 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 96 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). This opinion was quoted at length in Steffel and may thts have been adopted by
the Supreme Court.
68 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REV. 489
(1954).
69 Of course not in the case where the charges are brought in bad faith or to harass
the plaintiff. See Dombrowsld v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also note 66 supra.
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In Steffel, however, the Supreme Court refused to foreclose declaratory
relief in this manner. The Court found an actual controversy while also
finding abstention inappropriate." Accordingly, unless the plaintiff is
actually being prosecuted in state court for violation of the state
statute,"' the federal court should not abstain from issuing a declaratory
judgment:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the
federal complaint is filed, -federal intervention does not result in.
duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal
justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance,
be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability
to enforce constitutional principles . . . . [A] refusal on the part
of the federal courts to intervene when no state prooeeding is
pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of in-
tentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what
he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to
avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding. 2
In deciding that the facts in Steffel were not appropriate for absten-
tion from a federal declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court did
not decide that the same facts were sufficient for injunctive relief.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, pointed out that injunctive
relief must be considered separately from declaratory relief, since the
considerations which relate to granting the one remedy are different from
those which call for the other.7 ' Specifically, declaratory relief has a
less intrusive impact on the administration of state criminal laws,7 '
and the clear statutory intent to provide a federal forum for the declara-
tion of constitutional rights78 makes the showing of "irreparable harm"
70 415 U.S. at 458-59, 475.
71Id. at 475 n.22 (apparently a state declaratory judgment proceeding is not sufficient
to warrant abstention).
72 Id. at 462.
7-Id. at 469, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); Zwiclder v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965). Primarily, however, Brennan relied on his separate opinion in Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (1971), which opposed the traditional notion that requirements for
declaratory relief are the same as those for injunctive relief, as was suggested in Justice
Black's majority opinion in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971). In Steffel, Bren-
nan, speaking for the Court, went on to say that declaratory relief was available and
that the question whether injunctive relief is available "is a question we need not reach
today since petitioner has abandoned his request for that remedy." 415 U.S. at 436.
See also Zwiclder v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967).
74 415 U.S. at 469.
75 Id. at 471-72. The Court found this policy in the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). In civil rights cases, state remedies need not
be exhausted and hence, according to the Supreme Court, a declaratory judgment to
redress constitutional rights should be allowed without awaiting a criminal proceeding.
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required for injunctive relief not relevant. Therefore, the Court in
Steffel held that on the facts presented, declaratory relief was available
"regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate."'
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
It is generally accepted that like any other final judgment, a de-
claratory judgment settling rights between parties is res judicata and,
therefore, has collateral estoppel effects in subsequent litigation be-
tween those same parties. 77 As Professor Borchard wrote: "The
declaration is a conclusive determination of the rights of the parties
and is res judicata.'" ' The doctrine of res judicata, however, is not
without some generally recognized exceptions which apply to both de-
claratory and other final judgments. To date, the Supreme Court has
not explained the manner in which the doctrine of res judicata applies to
! federal declaratory judgment vindicating an individual's constitu-
tional right to engage in certain activity despite the existence of a con-
trary state statute. As Justice Brennan has observed: "[T]he federal
court judgment may have some res judicata effect, though this point is
not free from difficulty and the governing rules remain to be developed
with a view to the proper workings of a federal system."79
To determine whether the federal declaratory judgment should have
have any res judicata effect in subsequent litigation, it is necessary first
to determine whether that judgment falls within one of the presently
recognized exceptions to the res judicata doctrine. If it does not fit
within one of these exceptions, the implications of creating a new ex-
ception must be explored.
Recognized Exceptions to the Doctrine of Res Judicata
In a case like Steffel, either the litigation between the same parties
subsequent to the declaratory judgment action wi1l be a state court
criminal proceeding begun because state officials haLve decided to dis-
regard the federal declaratory judgment and prosecute the plaintiff, or
it will be a federal court action brought by the federal plaintiff to en-
force the declaratory judgment and prevent state officials from sub-
jecting him to state prosecution.
70 415 U.S. at 475.
77 See Note, The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Relief i; the Federal Courts, 46
S. CAL. L. REv. 803, 825 (1973).
78 E. BORCHAMn, supra note 49, at 172 (1934).
70 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted).
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State Criminal Prosecutions
Two problems are involved in applying the principles of res judicata
to a federal declaratory judgment raised in a subsequent state court
criminal proceeding. The first is that the effect of any type of federal
judgment in a state court may be different from its effect in a federal
court."0 The second is that many courts have recognized an exception to
the principles of res judicata when a declaratory judgment, which is a
civil judgment, is raised in a subsequent criminal proceeding."'
With respect to the effect of federal judgments raised in state
courts, it should be noted that although states should give full force
and effect to federal court judgments," they are not constitutionally
compelled to do so by the full faith and credit clause.8" Nevertheless,
there is some authority indicating that a state court is constitutionally
required by the Supremacy Clause to give a federal judgment res
judicata effect in its proceedings.8 4
As an exception to the general rule, though, three theories are ad-
vanced for not giving declaratory judgments any res judicata effect in
subsequent criminal proceedings. First, the burdens of proof in
civil and criminal proceedings are different.8" In an action for declara-
tory judgment, the burden is one of a preponderance of evidence,
whereas in the state prosecution, the state must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Allowing the state to plead a favorable federal declara-
tory judgment as res judicata would, of course, unconstitutionally
reduce the burden of proof necessary to convict the individual being
80 See Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief from Unconstitutional State Statutes:
The Implications of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. Rsv. 520,
541-50 (1974).
3146 AM. JuR. 2n DJdgments § 620 (1969): "[A] judgment rendered in a civil ac-
tion is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution where the judgment is offered
for the purpose of proving facts adjudicated thereby, although exactly the same ques-
tions are in dispute in both cases."82An American Law Institute report concluded that the state courts should give the
same full force and effect to federal court decisions that they grant to the decisions of
other states under the full faith and credit clause. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DmsioN OF
JuRIsDicrON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
93 By its terms the full faith and credit clause applies only to state courts. U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. But see Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938) : on the facts there
presented, an order by a federal bankruptcy court which was probably issued beyond its
authority was res judicata in subsequent state court proceedings. This case is easily
distinguishable since bankruptcy is an exclusively federal cause of action. State
courts, however, consistently hold federal adjudications to be res judicata. See cases cited
in 47 Am. Jun. 2D Judgments § 1293 (1969). But cf. Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp.
219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 903 (1971).84 See, e.g., Deposit Bank v. Board of Councilmen, 191 U.S. 499 (1903); Comment,
supra note 80, at 546-50, where the Deposit Bank case is discussed at length.85 See Note, supra note 77, at 827.
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prosecuted in state court. Allowing an individual to plead as res judicata
a federal declaratory judgment favorable to him, although probably
not unconstitutional, would violate the principle o: mutuality; and for
this reason, a court could refuse to accord declaratory judgments any
res judicata effect." Second, the right to confront witnesses, a right
constitutionally guaranteed in a criminal prosecution, is not applicable
to civil proceedings. Thus, were a state allowed to plead as res judicata
a favorable federal declaratory judgment, the individual's right to con-
frontation would be violated. Accordingly, allowing the individual to
rely on the doctrine of res judicata would raise once again the problem
of mutuality. ' Third, the parties in the two proceedings are different.
When an individual seeks a federal declaratory judgment against
enforcement of a state criminal statute, he must sue the state officer
charged with enforcing the statute, whereas in the criminal prosecution
the state itself, not the official, is technically the prosecuting entity."
Since the doctrine of res judicata has traditionally been applicable only
where there is an identity of parties, again, a court could refuse to
accord such a prior declaratory judgment res judicata effect in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution."
Despite these theories, the position that federal declaratory judg-
ments have no res judicata effect in state criminal proceedings is not
universally accepted. It has recently come under attack by one com-
mentator," and the Supreme Court has indicated that in some situations
it may well accord a declaratory judgment some res judicata effect in a
subsequent criminal proceeding.9' Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, con-
curring in Steffel, argued:
A declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights, not a
binding order supplemented by continuing sanctions. State author-
86 See Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of b.utuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J.
1 (1969). But see generally A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PREcLUSioN, at V-109 to -120
(1969); Note, supra note 77, at 829.
87 Note, supra note 77, at 830.
98 The technical difference, of course, is a necessary one developed to circumvent the
eleventh amendment prohibition on suits against states. See Er parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
69 See, e.g., Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1004 (1967).
0 Note, supra note 77.
91 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 335 (1957) (dictum). Admittedly, Yates in-
volved a subsequent federal, not state, criminal proceeding; nexertheless, even though it
is not relevant to the problem of the difference between state and federal forums, it does
apply to the problems raised by the difference between civil and criminal proceedings.
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ities may choose to be guided by the judgment of a lower federal
court, but they are not compelled to follow the decision ....
If the federal plaintiff pursues the conduct for which he was
previously threatened with arrest and is in fact arrested .
he may, of course, raise the federal declaratory judgment in the
state court for whatever value it may prove to have.92
Thus, whether a state court must accord a federal declaratory judgment
res judicata effect in a state criminal proceeding is apparently still an
open question.
Given the unsettled state of the law, an individual who has success-
fully obtained a favorable declaratory judgment cannot be sure that
the state court will accord that judgment res judicata effect and thereby
protect his constitutional right to engage in the activity in question.
Thus, where there is a substantial chance that the state may prosecute
in spite of the federal declaratory judgment, the individual may return
to federal court- to seek an injunction against the prosecution as
"[f] urther necessary or proper relief." 3
Subsequent Federal Proceedings
If he returns to federal court, the federal plaintiff need not over-
come the problems raised by different forums or the differences between
civil and criminal proceedings. From his concurrence in Steffel, it is
clear that Justice White believes that the declaratory judgment should
be res judicata ;4 but Justice Rehnquist would evidently accord it only
a stare decisis effect.95
There are three possible problems in applying the doctrine of res
judicata to declaratory judgments in a later federal proceeding. The
first is that the federal court presented with a prior declaratory judgment
must find identity of issues and identity of parties in order for the judg-
ment to be res judicata. Identity of issues would require a factual de-
termination that the conduct of the individual pleading res judicata was
sufficiently similar to the conduct of the plaintiff in the action for
declaratory judgment." In order to show identity of parties the indi-
vidual must show that he was a party to the earlier action or is for
some other reason entitled to raise the former suit as a bar to further
litigation of previously settled issues. The problem of identity of issues
and parties is essentially one that requires factual determinations. As
92 415 U.S. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
98 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970).
94 See 415 U.S. at 476-78.
95Id. at 482 n.3.
96 See Comment, supra note 80 at 554-56.
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such it must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, but it does not act as
a blanket prohibition to the application of res judicata9 '
The second problem is that where a prior determination of uncon-
stitutionality is raised in a subsequent proceeding, it is sometimes argued
that res judicata does not apply. One argument is that unmixed ques-
tions of law are not res judicata, 8 but federal courts have not accepted
this argument.9 Instead, they have generally prohibited relitigation:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result
of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered for-
ever settled as between the parties. 10°
The third, and related, problem is that the federal courts have
sometimes recognized an exception to the doctrine of res judicata where
an individual or a class of individuals asserts constitutional rights
through a habeas corpus action or a civil rights suit."' Where the
plaintiffs have previously lost a case to a governmental entity and, as a
result, are being continuously deprived of their fundamental liberties
despite an intervening change in the law, the courts have refused to ap-
ply the doctrine of res judicata to bar a second action by the plaintiffs.
For example, in a civil rights case, the Fifth Circuit noted:
The wisdom of the rule which exempts such cases from the doctrine
of res judicata is [dear]. . . . It would be a senseless absurdity
to sanction in Baton Rouge segregated seating under a law patently
unconstitutional while everywhere else in the cotntry segregated
seating is prohibited. The Constitution is not geared to patchwork
geography. It tolerates no independent enclaves 2
This exception has always been limited to serve the purpose of
preventing continued infringement of important constitutional rights.
It may be applied only where the prior litigation is "old and cold.""'
97id.
98 Unmixed questions of law are legal questions where the facts are not at issue.
According to the Restatement of Judgments, unmixed questiom, of law should be re-
litigated without the bar of res judicata. Id. § 70 (1942). This is quite apart from the
doctrine of stare decisis, which merely suggests that an earlier decision would be per-
suasive to the courts. A. VSTA L, REs JUDICATA/PREcLUsioN, at V-248 (1969).
99 Even if the argument were generally accepted it may not apply to the Steffel situa-
tion where the statute was attacked as applied, not on its face.
100 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). See also
United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924) (res judicata hell to bar relitigation of
unmixed question of law).
10 1 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) (habeas corpus) ; Christian v. Jemison,
303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (civil rights).
102 Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52, 55 (5th Cir. 1962).
30 Lipscomb v. United States, 298 F.2d 9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 853
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In a case like Steffel, however, the litigation is recent; therefore this
exception to the res judicata doctrine should not prevent the federal
declaratory judgment from being res judicata.
In summary, a federal declaratory judgment may have no res
judicata effects in subsequent state court criminal proceedings because
of certain widely recognized exceptions to the res judicata doc-
trine. No exceptions to that doctrine, however, would seem to prevent
the application of res judicata principles to a federal declaratory judg-
ment raised in a later federal court action for "[f]urther necessary
or proper relief" under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 4
The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Judgments
If the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to declaratory judg-
ments, they would be unique among "final" judgments of federal courts.
But like all federal judgments rendered by article III courts, a declara-
tory judgment must be a final judgment.' The Declaratory Judgment
Act emphasizes this point by explicitly stating: "Any such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall
be reviewable as such."'"
The argument has been advanced that to deny a declaratory
judgment res judicata effect is to deny it finality and, thus, to reduce it
to an advisory opinion."' This argument has been attacked by at least
one commentator who says that finality does not require that a judg-
ment be accorded res judicata effect."0 ' Still, the argument is widely
accepted"0 9 and when applied in this context leads inevitably to the con-
clusion that the declaratory judgment, to be constitutional, must be
accorded res judicata effect in the subsequent federal proceeding for
"[f]urther necessary or proper relief." Concurring in Steffel, Justice
White seemed to rely on this argument when he wrote: "[E]minent
authority anticipated that declaratory judgments would be res judicata
. . . and there is every reason for not reducing declaratory judg-
ments to mere advisory opinions.""0
The conclusion that declaratory judgments must be res judicata
in the subsequent federal proceeding, however, can be reached without
(1962); Turner v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Mo. 1962), appeal disnised,
325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1964).
104 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970).
105 U.S. CONST. art. III.
10628 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
107 See Note, mepra note 77, at 832-35.
108 Id. at 836-39.
109 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 80, at 551.
110 415 U.S. at 477.
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resort to the constitutional requirement of finality. The Declaratory
Judgment Act demands that the "declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.""' Basically, this is a requirement
that declaratory judgments be accorded the same weight as any other
judgment rendered by an article III court. From the above discussion,
it is apparent that federal declaratory judgments do have res judicata
effects when raised in subsequent federal civil proceedings and are not
within the recognized exceptions to the res judicata doctrine." 2
To make an exception of declaratory judgments would be to accord de-
claratory judgments a different weight than other judgments. Were
the principles of res judicata not to apply to declaratory judgments,
while applying fully to other federal judgments, the declaratory judg-
ment would not have "the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree."
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In Steffel, the expanded federal forum for anticipatory relief was
said to provide the federal plaintiff "with a concrete opportunity to
vindicate his constitutional rights.""' In many cases declaratory relief
is all that is necessary.'" In the 1973 abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade".5
and Doe v. Bolton,"' the Supreme Court granted only declaratory
relief and withheld injunctive relief. Despite the cortroversy surround-
ing those decisions, the declaratory judgment has proved sufficient. At
the time the judgments were rendered, however, declaratory judgments
had been issued only in circumstances where injunctive relief was also
appropriate." 7 This potential availability of injunctive relief may well
have deterred even the most hostile prosecutors. If injunctive relief
were not available, the deterrent to prosecution would be reduced. Also,
state courts would be more likely to deny res judicata effect to the federal
declaratory judgment. Thus, further relief may be necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of the declaratory judgment. The issue then becomes
whether an injunction may subsequently be granted as further relief
even though injunctive relief was not appropriate at the time the declara-
tory judgment action was brought." 8
" 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
112 See text accompanying notes 80-104 supra.
113 415 U.S. at 462.
14 See id. at 469.
115410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"1s410 U.S. 179 (1973).
17 See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 71-73 (1971).
I'8 Injunctive relief may not have been available to Steffel. 415 U.S. at 469. But see
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Principles of Equity, Comity, and Federalism
Once a declaratory judgment is obtained, the constitutional adjudi-
cation is res judicata in federal court." 9 Nevertheless, more than a
determination of unconstitutionality is required to obtain a federal in-
junction against enforcement of a state criminal statute. Such an in-
junction is a drastic measure, violation of which is punishable by con-
tempt. 2 Indeed, it is this element of enforceability which distinguishes
it from a declaratory judgment:
"[E]ven though a declaratory judgment has 'the force and effect
of a final judgment,' . . . it is a much milder form of relief than
an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately
coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not
contempt:'
1 21
As a result, the Supreme Court has held that the granting of an injunc-
tion requires a showing of "irreparable harm.' 22 This requirement is
unique to the injunctive-remedy and a product of the historical restraints
of equity. The requirement of "actual controversy" (for a declaratory
judgment) is similar to the "irreparable harm" requirement in that both
examine the motive and the extent of antagonism between the parties.
However, a greater degree of antagonism is necessary for a showing
of "irreparable harm" than for a showing of "actual controversy.''2"
generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 308 U.S. 479 (1965); Note, Federal Anti-Iniunction
Statute and Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 83 H, v. L. Rnv. 1879
(1970), suggesting that a great degree of irreparable injury or bad faith is not required
for federal injunctive relief where a first amendment right is being "chilled."
"29See text at notes 94-112 supra. The prosecutor has every right to appeal the
declaratory judgment in the federal courts before it becomes final. However, after an
appeal is unsuccessful, or if the prosecutor defaults, the litigation on the constitutional
issue ends. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b). In a declaratory judgment action, unlike a criminal
prosecution, the prosecutor does not have the same degree of control over the federal
litigation. In a prosecution, for example, he can control the time suit is to be in-
stituted, the party against whom proceeded, the choice of the opposing party, etc.
120The injunction is issued against a person (personally or ex officio-against an
office)-usually the state's attorney, but in the facts of Steffel possibly against the police,
the county prosecutor or the owner of the shopping center-and it carries with it the
penalty of contempt for violators. The contempt penalty can be imposed whether or
not the decision to issue the injunction was correct. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See C.
WRIGHT, HANDOOCK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 16 (1970).
121415 U.S. at 471, quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93, 125-26 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-49 (1971) (this part of the holding is undis-
turbed by Steffel). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (dictum).
Cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), Beal v. Missouri Pac. PLR.
Corp., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
128 Compare, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971) (Younger's co-
plaintiff had not even been threatened with prosecution; no actual controversy) and Stef-
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Thus, in order to obtain an injunction as further relief, a plaintiff like
Steffel will have to show antagonism sufficient to constitute "irreparable
harm" as well as plead the declaratory judgment as res judicata.
On the facts in Steffel, "irreparable harm" could not be shown
absent some indication by the prosecutor that he would disregard the
court's decision. For example, if the prosecutor threatens to prosecute,
the finding of "irreparable harm" will be based on the extent and nature
of the threat. Should the prosecutor actually file criminal charges, there
would be such a showing of "irreparable harm." ' By denying effec-
tive vindication of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, such action by the
prosecutor makes the equitable use of injunctive relief appropriate." 5
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the federal court must abstain
from issuing an injunction on the grounds of federalism-specifically,
the policy against federal interference in the state's enforcement of its
criminal laws.' In the context of a threatened criminal prosecution, a
federal court must balance its self-imposed policy of restraint from in-
terfering in the enforcement of state criminal laws with its interest in
protecting final judgments (as well as the plaintiff's coordinate interest
in avoiding relitigation).
In considering a request for an injunction where a state criminal
prosecution is threatened, according to Steffel (citing Younger v.
Harris), the federal doctrine of restraint is based on two factors. First,
a pending state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, provides the federal
plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for vindicating his constitutional
rights.17 Second, restraining an ongoing prosecution entails an unseemly
failure to give effect to the principle that the state court has the solemn
responsibility equally with the federal courts to guard, enforce and
protect every constitutional right.'28 These factors remain as strong
whether petitioning parties have previously received a federal declara-
tory judgment or are before the court for the first time.
The federal court's interest in the adjudication and duty to protect
fel, 415 U.S. at 458-59 (actual controversy) with Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965) ("irreparable harm").
"
4 See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 117-22 (1971).
125 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 618 (1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965). A three-judge court might not be required since "fi]f the declaratory judg-
ment has been affirmed on appeal the single judge's decision is not the basis for the in-
junction, and three-judge policy is not impaired." Currie, 7he Three-Judge District
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L, REv. 1, 18 r.102 (1964). Even if a
three-judge court were convened, it would determine only the identity of issues, the
identity of parties, and the existence of facts sufficient to constitute irreparable injury.
128See Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971).
127 415 U.S. at 460-61.
128 1d
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its own litigants, however, is much greater once a federal declaratory
judgment is rendered than when an injunction is initially requested. An
injunction by a federal district court "to protect or effectuate its [own]
judgments" is an express exception to the restraints of the anti-injunc-
tion act.'29 While the anti-injunction act is no longer considered a
meaningful restraint on the federal courts,"' this exception does evince
a congressional intent that an injunction be available to prevent state
proceedings from undermining a prior federal judgment.'
To prohibit an injunction once a declaratory judgment is rendered
would raise the possibility of relitigation of the case in state court, re-
sulting in an inconsistent state court judgment. Assume, for example,
that a federal district court erroneously declares a state statute uncon-
stitutional. Rather than appeal the declaratory judgment, the state
prosecutes an individual for violating the statute. The state court cor-
rectly finds the statute constitutional, and the individual is convicted.
When the conviction is appealed, the United States Supreme Court
will face a dilemma. If it upholds the state court decision, the federal
declaratory judgment would become meaningless. If, in order to avoid
this result, the Supreme Court considers itself bound by a lower federal
court's judgment, it would uphold an erroneous constitutional decision.
This dilemma is avoided if an injunction is available following a federal
declaratory judgment.
Injunctive Relief
On the facts in Steffel, where a declaratory judgment has been
obtained and state criminal prosecution has been threatened but not
instituted, the federal court's interest in preserving its judgments and
protecting its litigants outweighs the detrimental effects of interference
with the state's enforcement of its own criminal laws.
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time . . . .
federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings
or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal
intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting nega-
129 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Prior to Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118 (1941), the federal court power to protect or effectuate its judgments was assumed.
Congress expressly added the clause to reverse the result in Toucey. See compiler's notes
to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDmZx.
COURTS § 47 (1970).
130 Holzer, The Toothless Tiger: Section x983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187-A
Viable Exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute?, 38 ALBANY L. Rxv. 33 (1974).
'1' Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 304-05
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles.1 32
In these circumstances, an injunction enables the federal court to en-
force its judgment and avoids the difficulty of inconsistent judgments by
resolving the dispute within the federal system.
On the other hand, if, after a declaratory judgment but prior to
application for a federal injunction, prosecution has actually been in-
stituted in a state court (the more likely situation), the balance is
different. While the federal court's interests in enforcing its judgment
and preventing duplicative proceedings remain as strong, the disrup-
tion of the state's enforcement of its criminal laws is much greater.'3 3
A federal injunction clearly interferes with the state's prosecution and
shows little faith in the state court's ability to vindicate constitutional
rights.13" ' These considerations in Younger led the Supreme Court to
abstain from granting an injunction:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.13 5
Here Younger is inconsistent with the central concern of Steffel,
that the federal courts in a declaratory judgment provide a concrete
opportunity for a plaintiff to vindicate his constitutional rights. This
opportunity, however, would be meaningless if commencement of a
subsequent state prosecution could prevent a federal court from issuing
an injunction. Therefore, an injunction must be allowed.
The availability of a declaratory judgment under Steffel, when
combined with the ability to obtain an injunction as further federal re-
lief upon the showing of irreparable harm where prosecution is threat-
ened, effectively allows a federal plaintiff full anticipatory relief despite
the principles of "equity, comity, and federalism""n 6 that were so im-
portant in Younger. If an injunction can be so readily obtained, the
declaratory judgment is effectively as intrusive on the state's criminal
justice system as an injunction. Yet a declaratory judgment, which does
132 415 U.S. at 462.
133 The second circuit has found a preliminary injunction appropriate where a
declaratory judgment action is pending and state criminal prosecution has been threatened
but not instituted. 414 Theater Corp. v. Murphy, 499 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1974) ; see also
Joseph v. Blair, 482 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974).
184 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
285Id. at 44.
138415 U.S. at 460; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
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not require a showing of "irreparable harm," is more readily available
than an injunction. Consequently, the Supreme Court's preferences for
the declaratory judgment procedure must be based on a consideration
other than the degree of intrusiveness into the state's criminal justice
system.
One possibility is suggested by the Court's aversion to the
use of three-judge courts, the courts empowered to issue injunctions
against state statutes. " Decisions of such courts may be directly ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. " In a series of decisions, the Supreme
Court has narrowly construed this requirement because of the burden
it imposes on both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court it-
self.39 Since a declaratory judgment may be issued by a single district
court judge and reviewed by a court of appeals, it may be preferred
because it is less burdensome to the federal court system.""
A RACE TO THE COURTHOUSE
Federal anticipatory relief from enforcement of a state criminal
statute is available only so long as an action for declaratory judgment
is initiated in federal court before state prosecution is begun. How-
ever, "if the state prosecution was first filed and if it provides an ade-
quate forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights, the federal
court should not ordinarily intervene." '' Otherwise, the state is denied
a chance to adjudicate its own criminal laws. "[W]hether a federal
court should stay its hand" is determined "[o]rdinarily . . . by ex-
amining the dates upon which the federal and state actions were
filed.' ' 2
Thus, after Steffel, there is a race to the courthouse. Because of
this race, the prosecutor's desire to preserve a state forum will encourage
the filing of charges in questionable cases which might otherwise never
be brought. Such action will increase litigation and, by occupying more
individuals as defendants, may reduce freedom. However, the serious-
ness of the risk can be overemphasized. The individual does have the
freedom to obtain a federal forum, and foreclose state adjudication of
187 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (1970).
138 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
'99 Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101 (1967). See also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 86-87 (1971) ; Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1964) ; Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963) ; Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361
(1940).
140 Cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
141 Id. at 103.
142 Id.
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his allegedly criminal conduct, simply by filing first.
If, nevertheless, the race to the courthouse is perceived as a prob-
lem, the solution is not to reduce the extent of the impact of the federal
declaratory judgment in subsequent proceedings. Such a reduction
would only waste the time of a federal court-an increasingly scarce
resource. Moreover, such a reduction would be inconsistent with the
Declaratory Judgment Act. If proceedings in state court, whenever
instituted, foreclosed federal proceedings, the federal district court
would, at best, exercise its jurisdiction at the will of the state prosecutor,
who could summarily terminate federal proceedings by filing in state
court. Under these conditions, the availability of a federal forum would
have no utility.
CONCLUSION
After Steffel v. Thompson, under certain circumstances a declara-
tory judgment is available to provide relief from enforcement of a state
penal statute even though an injunction is not appropriate. Such a
federal declaratory judgment must be res judicata in federal court and
should be a bar to subsequent state prosecution. If a state nevertheless
seeks to prosecute, the federal court can issue an injunction based on
the declaratory judgment. If a state prosecution is begun before a
federal declaratory judgment is sought, however, federal anticipatory
relief is foreclosed. The forum in which the individual's constitutional
rights are adjudicated depends on who wins the race to the court-
house. This race is inevitable under our constitutional scheme of con-
current state and federal jurisdiction. As long as there is concurrent
jurisdiction, there will be forum shopping; and as long as the selection
of the forum depends on who files first, there will be a race to the court-
house.
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